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Abstract 
Fraud is always around, whether people notice it or not. Fraud has led to changes within the 
accounting world for decades. Standards and regulations are constantly changing and evolving to 
prevent frauds from occurring. Frauds in school districts are even more personal because not 
only we, as taxpayers, end up losing money that we have sent to the schools, but the people who 
are affected generally have kids attending this school. That is why procedures should be in place 
and maintained to stop frauds from occurring. The analysis of six major school district frauds in 
the state of Ohio gives an idea of how the fraud occurred, how the auditors assessed the fraud, 
and how the school district changed after the fraud, if they did. 
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Process Analysis Statement 
Corning with the idea for a thesis paper is not always the easiest of decisions. Someone could ask 
dozens of faculty and family members and still come away with a few possibilities. This was the 
case for me as nothing quite sounded like something I would want to spend hundreds of hours 
working on with an advisor. Eventually, though I had a break through: Dr. Renee Flasher 
informed me of her research over school district frauds all over the United States. For another 
student, this would not have meant anything, but for me, it was perfect. Fraud has always been 
something that intrigued me, but I needed something to make it a little more personal. That just 
happened to be making the frauds about something I could relate to: school district frauds. When 
I was in high school, a nearby school had a faculty member accused of fraud. I could finally see 
this paper going somewhere. I would do school district frauds, but all in the state of Ohio, my 
horne state. I could analyze this particular fraud that drove me to engage in this topic for my 
thesis. But I could not just do one fraud: there just is not enough material there for a whole 
thesis, so Dr. Westfall and I decided to analyze multiple cases throughout the state in the last few 
years. I had no idea which frauds I wanted to do or even how to go about finding the information 
on them. A simple email to Dr. Flasher would be the spark I needed to begin my research, She 
was generous enough to share her information with me on how she would choose her cases to 
research and where she would find the material to proceed. She informed me that she would find 
all her cases for Ohio on the State Auditor's website, which seemed simple enough to find. I 
went to their website and followed her instructions to find the audits, but alas, their website was 
down for maintenance. It says to email them if someone wants the information on the website. 
This would sound easy enough, except when I ernailed them, I did not receive a response. I 
thought to myself that this would be fine, the website should be up soon enough. I would be 
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wrong in this instance, as I type this five months after I originally viewed the website, it is still 
under maintenance. A week or so had passed, and I was still left sitting on my hands, not 
progressing in my research at all. Finally, I decided to call them and ask them when the website 
was going to be back up. They informed me that they were not sure, but they had an Excel 
spreadsheet with all the frauds on it. Perfect, now I can begin the research. As I opened the 
spreadsheet, I was not prepared for what I was about see. Here lay over 100 fraud audits 
performed by the Auditor of the State's office since 2011. Of these 100, I had to determine 
which ones related to school districts and which ones related to city offices, public services, and 
county offices. After reading through the audits, I had narrowed the audits relating to school 
districts down to about 25. Next, I read through these audits one more time to determine which 
six audits I wanted to analyze. Most of the audits were different variations of the same fraud 
style, so that added a level of stress to me that I would have preferred to avoid. How was I 
supposed to decide which six I wanted to review when they all present a similar style of fraud 
and audit? Eventually, I broke the list down to six based on magnitude of the entities, location, 
and the procedures the auditors used. Location was used for some of the frauds because a couple 
of them were relatively close to my school district, and I was aware of these occurring while I 
was in school. I just never was able to fully analyze or review them until this research. After I 
went through the school districts near me that experienced frauds, I went through the magnitude 
of the audit, both in terms of restitution and objectives that the auditors went through. The 
procedures that the auditors used was my next deciding factor, looking through the process that 
they used and if they found any evidence that led to any additional investigation. After deciding 
which six audits I wanted to examine, the process of forming them into analyses was an easy 
next step in the process. Overall, the examinations, analyses, and summaries of the audits was an 
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enjoyable process that not only added to my level of knowledge, but frauds are intriguing to 
engage with. The depth of these audits and the processes the auditors work with are something 
that anyone with an interest in accounting or fraud can use to improve his or her skills in the 
field. Even someone with no interest in accounting could enjoy this analysis to understand how 
frauds occur and how they can be prevented with some simple checks and balances. 
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Introduction 
Wrongful or criminal deception intended to result in financial or personal gain: it seems 
simple enough, but frauds are far from simple. They can last for years and could be so obvious 
that the average person could spot them. So why is it that they continuously happening? Most of 
the time, it is similar, the perpetrator thinks he/she can outsmart other individuals and get away 
with stealing money, assets, or information. In the short term, they might be right, but eventually 
slip ups may occur, and someone usually catches them. Hence, the auditors or police investigate 
and resolve the issue, including the perpetrator likely going on trial, any restitution he/she must 
pay, and establishing fraud prevention tactics. 
A theory in the criminal world around the fraud triangle exists that can be used to explain 
the reasoning behind a worker's decision to commit fraud. This theory was developed by 
American sociologist Donald R. Cressey, who worked in criminology and white-collar crimes. 
The first step of the triangle is the 
pressure on the individual to 
commit the fraud. This can be 
caused by personal financial 
pressure, whether this is due to a 
person having spending issues or 
The Fraud Triangle 
maintenance of a current lifestyle. The second s~ep is the opportunity for the person to commit 
the fraud. In this phase, the employee sees a clear course of action to abuse his position of 
authority to overcome his financial problems. This usually does not occur unless the perpetrator 
believes he can get away with it. The final step of the triangle is ability to rationalize the crime, 
which requires the employee to believe that what he is doing is not morally wrong. Most of the 
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perpetrators have never committed large scale crimes and do not see themselves as criminals. 
They instead see that they must do this, and they are the victims. The fraud triangle can be used 
to explain most instances of fraud. 
Each fiscal year, the Auditor of State in Ohio reviews each school district in an annual 
audit of the school's financial information. In these audits, the audit teams will review the school 
district's accounting policies, determining if the school is susceptible to fraudulent events. If the 
audit team sees a potential issue, they will inform the school of this and suggest actions to 
prevent a possible fraud. Even though the audit team informs the school, the school does not 
carry out this action plan. These instances are usually where the frauds occur, and the school 
districts are to be blamed. There are other instances where the audit team will not recognize the 
openings for the crime, and this can cause the fraud to occur for multiple years without anyone 
noticing. In this case, the fault of the fraud is put on both the school district and the Auditor of 
State. 
In school districts, schools are always trying to utilize state provided funds, so when a 
fraud occurs, the faculty and school can lose money. It would make sense that school districts 
would have policies and procedures in place to detect fraud early and prevent it; however, frauds 
are very common in schools. It isn't a geographic issue either, as these frauds are occurring all 
over the country. According to an article titled, "Bogus Barns and Administrative Excess: How 
School District Fraud and Waste Cuts Into Teacher Pay", an Arizona school district 
administrator stole $236,000, or about as much as the total teacher payroll. The article went on to 
say that Topock, the school district, "did not submit audits and had significant internal control 
deficiencies identified in the audit report." This fraud that cost the school a significant amount of 
money could have easily been avoided if the school implemented basic accounting oversight. 
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This is the case with many schools nationwide, so it leads to the questions: when will schools put 
in precautions to stop frauds? 
A career revolving around school district audits and frauds is certainly available and 
possible for anyone wishing to pursue this career path. Each state in the United States has an 
auditor's office that performs audits on not just school districts, but also village and county 
offices, courts, libraries, hospitals, etc. This would allow for an individual to experience many 
different types of audits and reports. For this analysis, the focus will remain solely on school 
districts in the state of Ohio as that would be where I grew up, and a few of these schoo I districts 
were rather close to my hometown. 
Now, while I may never deal with a school district fraud, or even an audit in this industry 
in my lifetime, frauds can be similar throughout various industries. Through studying these 
various audits in school districts, I intend to learn techniques to identify frauds before they 
become serious issues. The processes auditors use when working through fraud cases give me a 
fundamental basis to evaluate fraud related certifications when starting my career. 
The Auditors of State's office in Ohio has released every fraud audit that they have 
performed since 2011, detailing various information throughout the special audit. This 
information includes how the auditors were informed of potentially fraudulent activities, the 
process they used to review the evidence related to the fraud, the restitution the perpetrator must 
repay, and the policies the schoolhad in place to prevent the fraud. Most of the frauds that they 
have reviewed have involved money or theft of some form. There have been a few cases that did 
not involve money, but rather tampering with records or conflicts of interest. These cases would 
not usually result in any restitution, but potentially fines, community service, or even jail time. 
The State's office has released 29 unique audits regarding frauds in school districts since 2011. 
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Of these 29 cases, 24 of them have involved restitution being paid by the defendant. The 
minimum restitution paid in these 24 cases is $506, while the maximum amount paid is 
$3,400,000 (restitution for this case was split among 4 defendants). The mean restitution paid for 
these cases was $297,298, but the median of the population was much more reliable at $57,738. 
The standard deviation for restitution was $711,151, which shows the outliers in the population. 
In terms of restitution, most of the third quartile was rationed between multiple individuals. Of 
these 24 fraud audits presented by the State Auditor's office, six of these (or 25% ofthe 
population) will be thoroughly examined reviewing the audit, how the fraud occurred, how the 
perpetrator was revealed, any restitution paid by the defendant, any proactive policies in place by 
the school district, and if there were any additional preventative measures put in place to prevent 
future frauds. 
Case l 
The first audit review, relates to a standard theft by a faculty member. On May 26, 2016, 
the Auditor of State's office in Ohio released an audit with findings for recovery against an 
administrative assistant at Westside Community Schools of the Arts in Cuyahoga County. 
Raebecca White, the administrative assistant, was charged with theft after she was found to be 
stealing money from the charter school. According to the audit report, she stole $32,393 that was 
supposed to be deposited in the school's bank account. White was awarded a finding for 
recovery in the amount of $32,393 that she must repay as restitution. 
Westside Community Schools of the Arts was audited for the year ended June 30, 2015 
by the Ohio State Auditor's office. In this audit, the purpose of the auditors was to look for 
internal control deficiencies or material weaknesses with the school. They also checked for any 
compliance issues in accordance with GASB (Government Auditing Standards Board). The 
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school did not have any compliance issues, nor any internal control deficiencies. This makes the 
theft that Raebecca White was able to hide for five years even more confusing. 
Raebecca White was the administrative assistant at Westside Community Schools of the 
Arts. Her responsibilities included student material fee billings, collections, deposits, and 
processing. She would receive money collected by teachers for field trips, dress down days, 
fundraisers, and other activities. She was the initial point of contact for students and parents that 
made payments to the school. Ms. White was then tasked to prepare and deposit this money 
collected. The Auditor of State's office found 375 instances in which the money was not 
deposited and directly attributable to Raebecca White. When she was interviewed by the Auditor 
of State, she admitted to committing theft. Ms. White was terminated on March 26, 2015 for 
reasons unrelated to the theft. 
The Auditor of State's office was alerted to the case by a faculty member at the school. 
The office approached the case by looking through all the student receipts received by the school 
for the period July 1, 2011 through June 30, 2015. They then compared these receipts to the 
deposits made to the school bank account. They also compared the receipts for student material 
fees to the school Data Analysis for Student Learning (DASL) system reports. Of the 6,235 
receipts examined by the auditors, 482 of them, totaling $38,390, were identified as not 
deposited into the school bank account. The office directly attributed 375 of the 482 non-
deposited receipts, totaling $32,393, to Ms. White. The $32,393 is to be repaid by Raebecca 
White to the school in the appropriate funds: Westside Community School of the Arts General 
Fund for $27,767, Local Fund for $2,770, Field Trip Fund for $1,634, Student Activities Fund 
for $132, and Managed Student Activities Fund for $90. 
Case2 
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Similar to the previous case involving a faculty member stealing from the school, this 
second case also involves an employee stealing from both the school and the athletic boosters. 
The Auditor of State's office in Ohio released a special audit over Perrysburg Schools on 
February 2, 2016. This audit covered the period of January 1, 2009 to July 15, 2014. According 
to the special audit, the defendant ofthe case, Eric Whitson, stole more than $479,800 from the 
Perrysburg Exempted Village School District and another $181,900 from the Bowling Green 
Bobcat Athletic Boosters. Total findings for recovery for this case were $4 79,873 to be paid by 
Whitson (the Boosters are a nonprofit entity, and the Auditor's office does not have authority to 
issue findings for recovery). When searching for fraudulent activity, the State Auditor's office 
found another $3,751 of theft that was charged to District Treasurer Matt Feasel. Feasel was 
jointly liable for $91,588 ofthe $479,873 charged to Whitson. 
The Auditor of State's office was informed of suspected fraudulent activities in July 2014 
by the Wood County Prosecutor's office. The prosecutor's office requested a special audit from 
the State Auditor's office at this time along with assistance with a criminal investigation. The 
purpose of this audit was to "determine whether certain disbursements made by the District 
during the Period were supported and were for a proper public purpose" and "determine whether 
certain revenue collected during the Period by former District employee Eric Whitson was 
deposited into District bank accounts." There were some compliance issues that the auditors 
found, including lack of record retention and lack of timely deposits. 
Eric Whitson served as the accounts receivable clerk at Perrysburg Schools and volunteer 
treasurer for the Bowling Green Bobcat Athletic Boosters. Whitson was accused of stealing 
money from the athletic boosters and replenishing the money with checks from Perrysburg 
Schools. On July 2, 2014, Whitson was arrested and placed on administrative leave, and a day 
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later, a search warrant was executed on Whitson's residence. In his house, the Wood County 
Prosecutor's office and Bowling Green Police Department found cash, undeposited checks to the 
District and Boosters, computers, and financial documents. Whitson was terminated from the 
District less than two weeks later. 
Auditors found that Whitson had issued district checks totaling $169,220 to the Boosters 
that were not for district purposes or authorized by the District. These checks covered up cash 
that Whitson stole from the Boosters. Whitson also wrote checks without authorization to fund 
what Whitson claimed were personal and corporate donations to the athletic department totaling 
$71,992. Inside Whitson's residence, $30,398 in undeposited checks and cash was found by the 
police department and prosecutor's office. Another $10,900 ofundeposited checks was later 
found in a district storage room. While searching for information on Whitson, the auditors found 
that District Treasurer Matt Feasel was aware of some of the illegal transactions committed by 
Whitson. The auditors also found $3,751 of credit card expenditures made by district employees 
that were unrelated to district operations, all approved by Feasel. 
Of the compliance issues previously listed, the Auditor of State's office informed 
Perrysburg Schools of some recommendations that the school should implement to better protect 
the District from fraudulent activities in the future. One of the recommendations listed involved 
district credit cards. The previous District's credit card policy did not list information regarding 
limitations, supporting documentation, approval of use, or allowable expenses. The District also 
did not review credit card expenditures to track and ensure items were of District purpose or 
supported with proper funding. This resulted in missing information that would have been 
beneficial to the auditors throughout the process. The auditors also noted that the District should 
limit the number of credit cards used by the school, maintain and limit the number of credit card 
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transactions, and provide training to each card user to inform them of the policies regarding the 
credit card. Another recommendation involved segregation of duties regarding all phases of the 
accounting cycle. They include having different individuals be responsible for collection, 
deposit, posting, and review of revenue collection. Also, issuing disbursements, preparing 
checks, and reviewing credit card activity should be split between multiple employees. If 
segregation of duties is unattainable, oversight by management is a necessity to ensure 
appropriate transactions are occurring. The final recommendation that the auditors provided 
involved revenue recognition. The auditors noted several issues with revenue recognition at the 
District, including cash collections not being deposited or posted, checks issued to the District 
substituted in deposits for cash, deposits of funds made five or more days after collection, and 
duplicate receipts not always being issued. The auditors recommended for the District to issue 
duplicate receipts to individuals to document fees received, to maintain lists that contain 
collection information, and to reconcile the revenue ledger to ensure everything is accounted for 
properly posted. The District has gone on to put these recommendations into practice and 
monitor them much closer than before the fraud. 
Case3 
Like the fraud above being in the third quartile of restitution awarded, the third case was 
also among the largest of the special audits that the State's office has reviewed since 2011. The 
school district involved in this case is the Lion of Judah Academy in Cuyahoga County and 
spanned over four years and three audits. One of the defendants, Carl Shye, was charged for not 
just this fraud, but also for frauds at other community schools in Ohio. Four defendants were 
indicted on charges of unlawful interest in a public contract. The defendants were ordered to 
repay almost $1.3 million in restitution according to three audits released on February 13, 2014. 
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The periods covered and reviewed by these audits included 2007-2010. The Auditor of State's 
office conducted three different audits of the school district during this time. Of the audits 
completed, one was in 2007, one was in 2008-2009, and the last one was in 2010. In the first two 
audits, the audit team found some points of emphasis that they wanted the school to address, but 
the school district ignored these requests. Hence, the audit team performed a special audit of the 
school district in 2010, regarding the standards that the school district did not comply with. 
The 2007 audit was just a routine audit that the Auditor of State's office conducts each 
year over every school district. In this audit, the auditors found some concerning items regarding 
documentation and evidence for multiple portions of the audit. This included lack of evidence of 
Board approval of the salary and wage amounts paid to employees and no supporting 
documentation for expenditures or Other Revenue. They also did not provide evidence to support 
the notes to the financial statements. This affected the auditor's ability to gauge the internal 
control and compliance of the Academy. They still noted some material weaknesses and 
noncompliance: most of the findings for recovery in the 2007 related to the Academy not 
providing documentation for various checks disbursed throughout the year, the condition of 
accounting records, and developing an effective monitoring control system. The auditors even
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noted that "the failure to maintain adequate support for these expenditures could result in a loss 
of accountability over the Academy's finances, making it difficult to identifY errors which could 
go undetected." Hind-sight reveals that this was the first real warning sign around what was 
going on at the Academy. 
In the 2008-2009 Academy audit, the auditors found the same items regarding the lack of 
documentation for Other Revenue. In this audit, more accounts (receivables, payables, capital 
assets, and even cash) were n,ot supported by documentation. In this fiscal year, the Academy 
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entered into a contract with Carl Shye to serve as the Chief Fiscal Officer of the Academy. This 
is also the year in which the Academy entered into a public contract with Latter Enterprise, Inc. 
The issue with this contract was that Romey Coles, Superintendent of the Academy, Rosina 
Coles, Board President, and Shetyse Henderson, Business Manager for the Academy, were all 
incorporators of Latter Enterprise. During 2008, the Academy made payments of $246,198 to 
Latter Enterprise and another $246,440 during 2009. During the two years, $147,553 of the 
$492,638 were unsupported payments. Without documentation, it is impossible for the auditors 
to determine if these were school related expenditures or for the right purpose. Thus, the three 
school officials were jointly charged for the full amount of $492,638. Meanwhile, treasurer, Carl 
Shye, was made liable for this amount and ordered to pay restitution. 
The Academy also entered into a contract with Eclypse International LLC in 2008. The 
Academy overpaid Eclypse twice for work done at the school for a total amount of $24,500. This 
amount was charged to Shye and added to the restitution total. It was also revealed that the 
Academy was writing checks made payable to cash and withdrawing amounts of money in 
excess of $20,000. This amount was jointly charged to Coles, Shye, and Henderson. Coles and 
Shye also were charged with almost $32,000 in restitution due to writing checks with no 
supporting documentation. Shye and Coles were charged another $222,813 and $34,017, 
respectively for unlawful interest in a public contract. A few other charges were made against the 
four defendants in 2008. The auditors marked the Academy for noncompliance for the condition 
of the accounting records because of the incomplete information, lack of evidence, and lack of 
documentation. They also noted a material weakness of the entity-wide bank reconciliation, a 
material noncompliance over their Education Information Management System (EMIS), a 
material noncompliance for lacking a five-year forecast, a material noncompliance for their lack 
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of documentation regarding annual financial reporting. They noted another seven noncompliance 
issues that the Academy had not addressed. By the time this audit was completed in fiscal year 
2010, the damage had been done by the Academy. 
In the fiscal year 201 0 audit, the Academy still had not corrected their lack of 
documentation in multiple accounts on the financial statements. They also made more payments 
of $383,553 to Latter Enterprise. Payments to similar corporations from 2008-2009 were again 
made in 2010, but not to the amount of the previous years. By the time these transactions were 
going through, Edward Dudley had replaced Shye as treasurer of the Academy, but he claimed to 
be unaware of these transactions, saying officials of the Academy were going over his head. 
There were also the same material weaknesses and noncompliance as the previous year, except a 
few were changed and corrected. The Academy's sponsor was removed and placed under control 
of the Ohio Department of Education in September 2011. The Academy then ceased operations 
on May 3, 2013. Overall, the four defendants (Shye, Henderson, Coles, Dudley} were charged 
almost $1.3 million to be repaid as restitution. Shye was also sentenced to two years in prison for 
federal embezzlement in relation to this case and others. 
Case4 
While the previous case was rather large, in terms of both dollar amounts and years, the 
fourth case is on the smaller end of both of those terms. On March 31, 2015, the Auditor of 
State's office released a special audit against the Wauseon Exempted Village School District in 
Fulton County. A finding for recovery was issued against building secretary Angela Spadafore in 
the amount of $7,019 for theft. 
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The audit covered the period between July 2013 and October 2014, estimating the 
amount of money was stolen based on product purchased and profit margins. It was determined 
that Spadafore stole approximately $7,019 from vending machines over a little more than a year. 
She was responsible for collecting the money from the district vending machines and depositing 
it into the district's bank account. She did deposit some of the money she collected into the 
district's bank account; however, she was keeping significantly more than she was depositing. 
She ended up depositing $3,834 into the district's bank account, while embezzling about $7,019 
from the District during the 16 months. 
This theft was not found on the audit performed by Julian & Grube, Inc. for the period of 
July 1, 2013 to June 30, 2014. The Auditor of State's office had contracted Julian & Grube to 
conduct the audit. Julian & Grube did not report any findings or noncompliance with the school 
district; however, when the Auditor's office reviewed the audit, they noticed something odd with 
the related revenues and expenditures that they decided to investigate. With the profit margin and 
product purchases of the vending machines in previous years, they knew that the revenue 
appeared incorrect. When they questioned Spadafore, she confessed to the theft and then plead 
guilty. 
CaseS 
Most people may suspect that superintendents, who are generally viewed as the most 
credible people in a school system, would never commit fraud. The Auditor of State's Special 
Audit TaskForce rarely is used, so when it is utilized, intrigue is formed. In January 2015, the 
Special Audit Task Force initiated a special audit as part of a joint investigation with the Clark 
County Sheriffs Office and the Ohio Bureau of Criminal Investigation (BCI). This was after the 
sheriffs office notified the Auditor of State's office that Tecumseh Local School District 
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Superintendent, Bradley Martin, was seen gambling at a casino during school hours. The audit 
period was from October 12, 2012 through December 11, 2014 and detailed findings for 
recovery totaling $34,739 issued against Martin. 
The issue was not that Martin was gambling away school dollars, it was that he was paid 
to work at the school, but he was away at a casino gambling. The Auditors determined that 
Martin spent 307 and 121 scheduled work hours at the casino and commuting to the casino, 
respectively. He was paid $24,550 for this time that he was gambling and not working. This does 
not include the mileage reimbursements he received from the school for 77 trips which were not 
related to operations of the school district. He also skipped three meetings to gamble, which 
totaled $805 in registration fees for the district. It does not stop there either. Martin was 
reimbursed $6,470 for 12 iPads he claimed to have purchased for the district. The district never 
saw eight of those, valued at $4,493. 
The purpose of the audit was to (a.) examine documentation supporting casino slot 
machine playing activity associated with Martin and determine whether it was during work hours 
and (b.) examine documentation supporting non-payroll disbursements made payable to Martin 
to ensure that they were for district purposes. 
The audit team obtained Mr. Martin's contracts with the District to determine pay for the 
audit period. They also investigated scheduled work days and identified days that Martin used 
sick days. They also obtained casino records from five casinos around the state of Ohio. They 
identified which days and times Martin was at these casinos. The Special Audit Task Force then 
went to collect cell phone tower analysis prepared by BCI to determine where Martin was at 
during work hours. 
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Their second objective dealt with the expense reimbursements on the iPads. The audit 
team identified all non-payroll disbursements issued to Martin, and they examined available 
supporting documentation to determine whether these transactions were district related or not. 
This was also the pati of the process in which they investigated ifMartin attended the meetings 
that the district paid the registration fees. Again, they examined cell phone records to determine 
where Martin was at during these meetings if attendance records were not available. At the end 
of the audit process, they issued a management recommendation to verify goods purchased prior 
to issuing payment. In all, Martin was ordered to pay $34,739 in restitution, and he pled guilty to 
three criminal charges: theft in office, tampering with records, and forgery. 
Case6 
The sixth case in this analysis is unlike any of the others reviewed. This case does not 
involve any money, just a culture of corrupt behavior and employee manipulation at Columbus 
City School District (District). The period under review by the auditors was July 1, 2010 through 
June 30, 2011. In the process of investigating the District, the Auditor of State's office 
interviewed more than 40 principals and assistant principals, more than 230 teachers, the 
available Regional Executive Directors (REDs), more than 20 secretaries and other office 
personnel, and 25 current and former employees of the Kingswood Data Center. The audit team 
determined that the District had a top-down culture of data manipulation and employee 
intimidation. 
During the audit process, the Auditor of State's office became aware of alleged 
attendance and grading practices that were occurring at the District during their statewide 
examination of school districts. The auditors review potential data manipulation at each school 
district annually. The scrubbing of attendance data would make a district look better, improving 
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their performance ratings. This led the office to launch a special audit of the District. The audit 
process began with the auditors reviewing historical data and records back to 2002. They also 
began their interview process of individuals around the area or involved with the school district. 
The investigators reviewed thousands of emails, documents, student cumulative files, electronic 
files, and records provided by Columbus City Schools. Throughout the process, the auditors 
learned of a culture in which employees believed they had to skew data or they would face 
consequences. This pressure was felt all the way from principals to teachers. Teachers felt 
pressure from administrators to change grades because principals were pressured by REDs to 
show improvement from year to year. Most of the time, the faculty were forced to show 
improvements that did not really exist. If they did not comply, firing was a certain possibility; 
however, compliance led to promotion. The auditors would have expected an increased funding 
if attendance records increased. This was not the case at Columbus City Schools, as funding was 
almost inversely related to attendance. 
Districts employees, in interviews, admitted to the process of withdrawing andre-
enrolling students with poor attendance and low-test scores so their test scores would be "rolled 
up" to the state and not be reported in the district's review. This process was led by 
administrators Steve Tankovich and Michael Dodds. In fact, the Auditor of State's office 
determined that 374 students were withdrawn and re-enrolled all on the same day. Over 100 of 
these cases of withdrawal andre-enrollment were not supported by any documentation. There 
was also a review of 200 letter grade changes that the district could not provide supporting 
justification. This made it difficult for the auditors to determine whether the grade change was 
reasonable or not. The chart below shows the direction of the letter grade changes over the 
course of the audit period. Most ofth~ bumped-up grade changes could not be proven with 
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evidence or documentation. On top of this, the audit team reviewed student absences from May 
and June 2011. They determined that 87% of these absences were scrubbed just a month after the 
absence. 
DIRECTION OF LETTER GRADE CHANGES 
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•Note: Examples of lateral changes included changes from percentage grades to letter grades. These 
changes represented lateral changes as there was no identified directional change in the reported 
grade. 
The audit team made several recommendations to the school district that were 
implemented. These included maintenance of documentation supporting grade changes, 
notifications to teachers if administrators adjust grades at the end of the nine-weeks, unity in 
determining final grades, and training for making grade level changes, among others. The 
Columbus City School District remains under scrutiny today by the Auditor of State's office. 
Conclusion 
Understanding the audit cases as they relate to the special audits will allow me to develop 
skills and knowledge without even having seen a fraud in my life. This will not only give me an 
advantage if I do encounter one, but it will also allow me to look for inconsistencies in audits to 
identify frauds. I could even use what I have learned here on the exam in the process of getting a 
certification in fraud examining. To receive the certified fraud examiner (CFE) credential, one 
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must pass all four parts of the CFE exam. This exam includes questions regarding fraud 
prevention and deterrence, financial transactions and fraud schemes, investigation, and law. The 
fraud prevention and deterrence portion of the exam tests 'one's understanding of why people 
commit fraud and ways to prevent it. The financial transactions and fraud schemes part of the 
exam includes testing over the comprehension of the types of fraudulent financial transactions. 
This includes demonstrating knowledge of basic accounting and auditing theory and intemal 
controls to deter fraud. The third part of the exam, investigation, includes questions regarding 
interviewing, taking statements, and tracing transactions to the root. The final part of the exam, 
law, tests one's familiarity with legal ramifications of conducting fraud examinations. Fraud is 
certainly a tricky subject, so any chance to be exposed to it and teaming about it can only help in 
the future. 
Most frauds, including those reviewed above, could have been prevented if basic 
procedures were in place to stop them before they occurred. Checks and balances, accounting 
oversight, and separation of duties are simple measures that school districts should have in place 
to avoid losing thousands or millions of dollars as shown above. Most schools even have intemal 
audit departments, which check for material weaknesses or deficiencies. So why do these frauds 
occur at the rate that they do? Is it because school districts ignore the 'audits performed each 
year? Is there too much trust between the employees at these schools? It is tough to narrow it 
down to one specific reason, but any of these are possibilities. These cases have shown that 
everyone in the school district can be responsible for committing a fraud, and the cost to school 
district, even if it is not theft, can be monumental. Recovering from a significant fraud can set a 
school district back years in terms of both money and reputation. School districts, or for that 
20 
matter, any business, should not waiver on being on the conservative side when discussing frauds 
as they can be treacherous to employees, investors, and creditors. 
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